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Bribing Biodiversity: Corruption, Participation, and
Community-Based Management in Venezuela*
Brooke Ann Zanetell
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Barbara A. Knuth
Human Dimensions Research Unit, Department of Natural Resources
Cornell University
ABSTRACT Widespread alarm over the continuing decline of
marine and freshwater fisheries has prompted research on the theory and practice of community-based management (CBM). Considering the suite of possible CBM benefits-including local
involvement, compliance with regulations, reduced enforcement
costs, and sustainable resource use--it is understandable that CBM
projects are on the rise. However, there is insufficient examination of the challenges to CBM and the context-specific feasibility
of grassroots stewardship. In response, we applied an assessment
framework to a Venezuelan fishery to evaluate the feasibility of
CBM and to identify barriers to its hition. We used a variety of
methods in concert (including observation, Rapid Rural Appraisal,
a survey, and interviews) to assess the characteristics of the 1) resource, 2) user group, and 3) governing institutions. Our results
show that resource and user group characteristics are CBM compatible. The negative influence of all institutional characteiistics-particularly impediments to local participation and the
prevalence of corruption-makes CBM unfeasible in the study site
at this time.
We discuss these barriers and their implications.
The details of reforms necessary to facilitate CBM and prevent
fish species loss are, however, beyond the scope of this study.
*For their generous support and contributions, the authors thank 1) Dr. Donald
Taphorn, Director, and the faculty and staff at the Museo de Zoologia, Universidad Nacional Experimental de Los Llanos Occidentales "Ezequiel Zamora";
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and Carlos Hidalgo in Guanare, Venezuela; 2) the residents of El Potrero,
Quebrada del Mambn, and Nueva Florida in the State of Portuguesa, Venezuela; and 3) Dr. Alex Flecker, Cornell University. The J. William Fulbright
Foreign Scholarship Board, the Institute of International Education, and the
Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station provided funding for the
research.
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Despite the best efforts of managers and policymakers worldwide,
diminishing species and disappearing or degraded ecosystems are
clear signs that humans are not using natural resources sustainably.
This brings into question the efficacy of conventional top-down
strategies that dominated natural resources management in the
twentieth century. In response, there is a burgeoning interest - both
domestically and internationally - in alternative approaches that
devolve decision-making and management responsibilities to local
resource users. In the current natural resources management era,
grassroots stewardship is paramount to enforced compliance of
hierarchical rules. Community-based management (CBM) is a term
commonly applied to decentralized, grassroots approaches to natural resources management.
In fisheries management, for example, widespread alarm
over the continuing decline in marine and freshwater stocks
(McGinn 1998; Newton and Dillingham 1997) has prompted research on the theory and practice of CBM. considering the suite of
possible community-based fishery management benefits-including
local-level involvement (Nugent, Wellman and Leibovitz 1996),
acceptance and compliance with regulations (Davis and Bailey
1996:26 1-2), reduced costs for enforcement (Renard 1991 :5), and
ultimately, sustainable use of fishery resources (Christie, White and
Buhat 1994: 116)-it
is understandable that proponents are anxious
to initiate CBM projects. "The greatest impediment to achieving
these goals" observed Kenney "may be an 'over enthusiasm' of
some of its proponents" (1999:37).
There is a paucity of research and literature exploring the
challenges inherent to CBM and acknowledging the complexity
involved with putting management in the hands of the local people.
In many forums, CBM has received the simplified tieatment of
hand it over to the people and they21 do what's best for the resources and their fiture. According to Little (1994:349), "An
improved understanding of the different social, political, and historical contexts under which local conservation takes place will
help debunk the false notion that all communities, if left alone, are
able to defend and conserve their resources in a sustainable fashion." CBM proponents must be wary to invest the patience, time,
and strategic planning necessary to maximize the probability of
long-term, project success. This involves identifying existing
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol18/iss2/6
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inroads and potential roadblocks during the initial stages of project
inventory and design that can help or hinder a CBM effort.
Assessment Framework

To address this research need, we evaluated the feasibility of CBM
in a Venezuelan fishery using a CBM assessment ffamework
adapted from Gardner and Stern's (1996) checklist of communitymanagement criteria. Gardner and Stern's ( 1996:130) checklist
outlines characteristics of successful CBM initiatives based on
themes identified by Ostrom (1990) in her extensive analysis of
case studies involving the sustainable use of common-pool resources. Government action at the regional and national levels was
the only theme suggested by Ostrom that was not included in Gardner and Stern's framework. Therefore, we added criteria drawn
from Gardner and Stern's (1996:134-5) discussion of institutional
openness to our framework that assess the characteristics of govemment and institutions. Gardner and Stem's theme of evaluating
rules developed by the user group was not considered because this
study assessed a proposed CBM initiative rather than an ongoing
project. Willingness to participate was added as a criterion of
characteristics of the user group because it is a crucial component
of CBM efforts. This point is articulated by Vivian (199 1 : 1):
Resource management projects, as currently implemented, depend heavily on broad-based cooperation and collaboration because they often rely
on the combined actions of individuals which,
whether they be planting trees or refraining from
overfishing, by their nature cannot easily be coerced or enforced. The willingness of people to
undertake the required activities-what is commonly understood as their 'participation1-is therefore essential for the success of these projects.
Our final assessment framework contained criteria grouped
into three general themes: 1) characteristics of the resource, 2)
characteristics of the user group, and 3) characteristics of government and institutions (see Table 1).
Published by eGrove, 2002
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Table 1. CBM Assessment Framework Applied to Feasibility of
Community-Based Fishery Management, Portuguesa River
Watershed, Venezuela, 1998.

Assessment
~ethod~

Criteria for
Successful CBM'

I. Characteristics of the Resource
Resource is controllable locally
- Definable boundaries
- Resources stay within boundaries
- Resource can be monitored

Indicator
Value for
Portuguesa
River

- RRAd
-RRA

- Observation
- Observation

11. Characteristics of the User Group
Local resource dependence
- Perce~tiblethreat of resource deoletion
- ~iffidultyof finding resource substitutes
- Difficulty of leaving area
Presence of community
- Stable, small populations
- Network of social interactions
- Shared norms for upholding agreements
- Local knowledge informs effective rules
Willingness to participate

- Survey
- Survey

- Observatiodsurvey
- Observatiodsurvey
- Survey
-RRA

- Observatiodsurvey
- RWSurvey
- RRAlSurvey

- Survey

111. Characteristics of Govt & Institutions
Devolution of power to local level
- Government values local knowledge
- Rules are product of participatory choice
- Legal status given to local regulations
Corruption-free, fair enforcement
- Bribes and cheating not permitted
- Selfishness, social elites not awarded
- Government accountable to local users

- Observation
- Observationhterviews
- Observationhterviews
- Observationflnterviews
- Observationhterviews
- Observationhterviews
- Observationhterviews
- Observationhterviews

"Criteria adapted from Gardner and Stem (1
. 996), and Ostrom(.1990).
,
b~bservatio"s,RRA, a quantitative survey, and interviews with key informants
were the methods used alone or in concert to evaluate each criterion.
'Each criterion is a positive or negative indicator of the current feasibility of C B M
in the Portuguesa River fishery.
d
RRA is an acronym for Rapid Rural Appraisal, a participatory research
methodology.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol18/iss2/6

4

Zanetell and Knuth: Corruption, Participation, and Community-Based Management in Venezuela

134

Southern Rural Sociology, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2002

Study Site
The CBM assessment framework is designed to be applicable to a
variety of natural resource management contexts. For our study, we
used the framework to assess the feasibility of community-based
fishery management in a freshwater fishery in the Orinoco River
basin in Venezuela, South America. Originating in the Andean
piedmont, rivers throughout the state of Portuguesa flow downward
into the vast Orinoco River floodplains called the llanos. This
transition coincides with a marked increase in fish species diversity,
from 80 species in the piedmont (Matthews 1998:40-1) to over 200
species in the llanos (Winemiller et al. 1996:23). The two distinct
physical portions of these watersheds are linked ecologically
through the biannual migrations of numerous fish species (Winemiller, Marrero and Taphorn 1996:16,32). We selected the Portuguesa River because it is one of the few commercially important
rivers in the Orinoco basin that is not yet dammed. This ensures
that fishing practices of fishers upstream and downstream were
linked by freely-migrating fish populations.
For generations the well-being and livelihood of fishing
communities has depended on exploitation of this fishery resource
(Duran 1995:22). Fishery managers and researchers are concerned
by a recent decline of commercial fish species, raising questions
about the sustainability of current fishing practices and the potential
loss of biodiversity if these trends continue (Novoa 1986; Winemiller et al. 1996). This situation makes CBM considerations in the
Portuguesa River watershed appropriate from both biological and
sociological perspectives. We applied our CBM assessment
framework to an in-depth study of fishery management in the state
of Portuguesa to evaluate the compatibility of current characteristics of the resource, user group, and governing institutions with
CBM.
We studied three villages along the Portuguesa River that
were similar in population size, distance from the river, and in their
relative interaction with Guanare, the capital city of the state of
Portuguesa. Upstream to downstream, the three villages were 1) El
Potrero in the piedmont, 2) Quebrada del Mam6n and 3) Nueva
Florida in the llanos. Guanare was the site of most data collection

Published by eGrove, 2002
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from government-employed fishery officials and university-based
fishery researchers.
Methods

Spanning eight months in 1998, we gathered data in the state of
Portuguesa, Venezuela, which we compared to the CBM assessment
framework criteria. Each criterion was considered in light of the
current circumstances of the Portuguesa River watershed, communities, and governing institutions. We used a variety of methods in
concert (including observation, Rapid Rural Appraisal, a quantitative survey, and interviews) to determine if each assessment framework criterion was sufficiently present or absent in the Portuguesa
River watershed to be designated as a positive or negative indicator
of CBM feasibility. For each overarching characteristic - e.g.
resource, user-group, or governance - we considered the cumulative
positive andlor negative assessment of the associated criteria and
concluded whether or not CBM was possible at present for that
characteristic.
Observation

For our Venezuelan case-study, we consistently used observation
and descriptive note-taking in the village, institutional, and university environments we encountered. Observation is a qualitative
research method that can be used independently, for example by
anthropologists in ethnographic research (Frake 1988), or in addition to methodologies used by a variety of research disciplines such
as sociology, history, political science, and ecology (Yin 1994:87).
Requiring researcher presence at the study site-fcl example, a
village, a corporation, or a forest+bservation is less of a skill, than
an art that "involves the interweaving of looking and listening, of
watching and asking" (Lofland and Lofland 1995:19). Typically,
detailed descriptive field notes are taken that enable interpretation
and analysis by both the researcher and others at a later time and
away from the study setting (Patton 1990:241-2). While the descriptions should be as objective as possible, subjective interpretations, labeled as such by the researcher, are also included in field
notes (Patton 1990:241). Observation provides a contextual insight
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol18/iss2/6
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that is useful for understanding and explaining results of other
methods such as quantitative surveys. To avoid bias, triangulation
with other methods or with other researchers' observations of the
same phenomenon is recommendable (Yin 1994:90-4).

Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA)
Approximately one month was spent in each village conducting a
Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA). RRA techniques were used to
document local knowledge regarding declining fish populations in
the Portuguesa River and shed light on the socio-economic and
historical factors influencing rural fishery use and river health. A
community map, historical profile, Venn diagram, and river-fishery
map were made by residents at each site (for details on RRA and its
application in the Portuguesa River watershed see Zanetell and
Knuth 2002). These RRA techniques are only a sampling of the
RRA tools available to researchers for garnering local participation
in the research process (Khan and Suryanata 1994; Pretty et al.
1995).
RRA is closely associated with Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA). The primary distinction is that in RRA, there is a
predetermined research agenda or question, whereas in PRA the
local participants determine for themselves what questions they will
study and the purpose of the research. While RRA typically begins
and ends with data collechon, PRA is often used to initiate local
action and facilitate change (Chambers 1994). Both RRA and PRA
aim to engage local knowledge, and this requires recognition that
intelligence is not constrained to diploma-bearing scientists and a
methodology that serves as a conduit between rural peoples and
researchers. Chambers (1992--quoted in Freudenberger 1994:9)
stated that the common notion that rural people are uneducated is
"an artifact of our ignorance of how to enable them to express,
share and extend their knowledge." RRA techniques facilitate local
participation in the research process. The hope is that by involving
people in the research rather than simply studying them, the information gathered will be more complete and informative than data
generated solely by quantitative surveys (Gill 1993).

Published by eGrove, 2002
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Quantitative Survey
A quantitative survey measuring willingness to participate in community-based fishery management was given to 221 heads of
households in the Portuguesa River watershed. Based on a literature review, observations, and the RRA, we constructed scales to
measure the influence on the dependent variable willingness to
participate of five independent variables: I) dependence on the
fishery; 2) perception about the state of the fishery; 3) level of
concern about the fishery; 4) perceived locus of authority over the
fishery; and 5) sense of community. Responses to scale items as
well as mean scores for the 16-item sense of community scale and
the 6-item willingness to participate scale contributed to the evaluation of several of the CBM assessment framework criteria.
Sample-size. We calculated the sample size for each village
using the following criteria: 1) each village had a finite population
determined by the number of households; 2) the outcome of the
response variable-Willingness to Participate-is binary across the
villages (i.e. willing or not willing); and 3) the test for significance
is set at the .05 level; with 4) a power to detect differences of 0.15
between villages. These criteria required a sample of 80 households in El Potrero, and 65 households in each of Quebrada del
Mam6n and Nueva Florida. We used a random numbers table (Ott
1993:A-23) to generate the sample for each village. We actually
surveyed 81 households in El Potrero, 66 in Quebrada del Mambn,
and 74 in Nueva Florida. In each village, only 1-3 households
refused to participate in the survey. These refusals were handled by
substituting the declining household with the nearest house not
already selected as part of the random sample. We questioned the
head of each participating household for a total of 124 adult male
respondents and 97 adult female respondents.
Survey enumeration and analysis. To make the survey as
understandable as possible to respondents, we pre-tested item
content and word usage with a group of Venezuelans who regularly
fished in the Portuguesa River but did not live in any of the study
sites. The final survey was given orally in each site by a group of
10 young men and women from the three villages who attended the
university in the city of Guanare. Response validity was high
because it was difficult to mislead the assistants who had themhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol18/iss2/6

8

Zanetell and Knuth: Corruption, Participation, and Community-Based Management in Venezuela

138

Southern Rural Sociology, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2002

selves grown up along the Portuguesa River. Surveys in each
village were given in a concentrated two-day effort. Survey training was done the first morning of each site visit. A "round-robin"
training technique (Weinberg 1983:343-7) taught correct voice level
and pace, probing without leading, and how to record responses.
We analyzed survey data using an SPSS 1999 statistical software
package for social science research.
Interviews
Observation and recommendations lead to the identification of 25
key informants from village, government, and academic sectors that
were not only knowledgeable about the fishery, but also respected
by their peers. Yin (1994:84) suggests that key informants are
those individuals whose insights critically inform the current casestudy as well as future inquiry. From the three villages, a total of
15 key informants were interviewed. Of these, nine were village
elders (all male) and six were adults between the ages of 35 - 50
years old (three male, three female). From the Universidad Nacional Experimental de 10s Llanos Occidentales "Ezequiel Zamora"
(UNELLEZ) in Guanare, State of Portuguesa, five scientists were
interviewed as key informants (two male, three female). The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAC) and the Ministry of the
Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (MARNR) are the
two government agencies involved with fishery management in the
state of Portuguesa. From these agencies, five key informants were
interviewed (four male, one female).
Each key informant was interviewed in a familiar setting
(Yow 199457) for 1-2 hours. We encouraged interactive conversation (Albrecht, Johnson and Walther 1993) and probe questions
(Patton 1990:324-7) ensured that a "guided conversation" (Lofland
and Lofland 1995:85) occurred on the theme of CBM feasibility.
Notes taken during interviews were augmented immediately following to capture all significant information. All quotes in this text are
in English although some interviews were conducted in Spanish.
Translations represent as closely as possible the original content
and intent of the interviewee. Key informant opinions are in response to the current situation in the state of Portuguesa and do not
Published by eGrove, 2002
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necessarily reflect the state of fishery management and the feasibility of CBM in other sectors of Venezuela.
Results: Characteristics of the Resource
Resource Is Controllable Locally

The results of the RRA map-making activities indicate that biannual
spawning migrations in the Portuguesa River-some more than 200
kilometers from the piedmont to the llanos (Winemiller et al.
1996:23)will require coordinated local control between fishing
villages throughout the watershed. This added complexity is a
negative indicator of the feasibility of CBM in the Portuguesa River
watershed.
Definable Boundaries

The Portuguesa River has definable physical boundaries indicated
by fishers on RRA maps and corresponding to official topographic
maps (Direccion de Cartografia Nacional 1975). Fishers in each
village demonstrated a thorough familiarity and understanding of
the physical characteristics of the river and seasonal factors influencing fish activity within the stretch of Portuguesa River they
fished most frequently. The challenge, however, is that fish migrate
upstream and downstream of each village's normal fishing boundaries. "Migratory fish populations cover areas many orders of magnitude greater than those of proposed or traditional property
boundaries" (Welcomme 1985-cited by Bayley 1992:7). Therefore, definable boundaries are positive indicators, at the local level,
and negative indicators, at the watershed level, rekarding CBM
feasibility.
Resources Stay Within Their Boundaries

In addition to natural migrations in and out of local boundaries, the
movements of fish are subject to market demands. Fish caught by
subsistence fishers normally stay in the basin of origin, whereas fish
harvested by commercial fishers are transported by middle-men to
markets throughout Venezuela. Increasing demand for fish in the
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol18/iss2/6
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Venezuelan markets has prompted rural fishers to increase fishing
pressure (Duran 1995:22) on the fish species of most concern to
fishery managers (Duran 1995) and researchers (Winemiller et al.
1996) as being threatened with extinction. Therefore, the fish
species in most critical need of protection are the most likely to be
removed from the basin they inhabited. The exportation of fishery
resources from their local boundaries is a negative indicator of the
feasibility of CBM in the Portuguesa watershed.
Changes In The Resource Can Be Adequately Monitored
Information gathered by villagers during daily fishing trips inform
continual assessments of fish stock status and factors influencing
fishery health. These assessments were far more accurate than
judgments made by fishery inspectors located in central offices
(personal observation 1998). Family ties and neighbor relationships
were conducive to information sharing between villagers of new
conditions and changes in the fishery. This communication network is an indication that the local users currently monitor the
fishery for their own benefit, and would be able to do so for the
purposes of community-based management. The capacity to monitor resources locally is a positive indicator of the feasibility of
CBM, although comprehensive monitoring of migrating fish populations will require establishing communication networks between
all Portuguesa River fishing villages.
Results: Characteristics of the User Group
Local Resource Dependence
From all three villages, 54 percent of survey respondents agreed
with the statement: "Your ability to provide food for the people in
this house is dependent on living near the Portuguesa River." Of all
respondents, 46 percent agreed that "the money you make is dependent on living near the Portuguesa River." These results indicate that at least half of the current watershed residents would be
affected negatively by the loss of the fishery and that continued
availability of this resource plays a vital role in watershed socioeconomic stability. This demonstrated reliance on the Portuguesa
Published by eGrove, 2002
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River fishery is a positive indicator of the feasibility of CBM.
Perceptible threat of resource depletion. Of all the households surveyed in the Portuguesa River watershed, 75 percent
believe that there are less fish than in the past, 69 percent hold that
average fish size has decreased, and 83 percent stated that they
catch less fish in one hour with a cast net today than in the past.
Despite these warning signs of impending fishery collapse, concurrent local concern is lacking because fish remain sufficiently abundant to support commercial and artisanal fishing (personal
observation 1998). Therefore, perceived resource depletion is
considered both a positive and negative indicator of the feasibility
of CBM.
DlfJiCulw of finding substitutes for local resources. Gardner and Stern (1996) held that community management efforts are
typically more successful where the natural resource of concern
cannot be replaced with a functionally-comparable or sociallyacceptable substitute. In Venezuela, there is not a national reliance
on the Portuguesa River commercial fishery. There is, however,
local reliance on the fishery as a food source, particularly of protein
(Chapman 1979:38; Novoa 1986:184). Of all households surveyed,
84 percent participated in subsistence fishing. The difficulty of
finding substitutes for the fishery is a conservation incentive to
local users and thus a positive indicator of the feasibility of CBM in
the Portuguesa River watershed.
DlfJiculw or expense attached to leaving area. Related to
resource substitutability is the issue of whether or not an occupational substitute exists for the fishers (48 percent) who depend on
commercial fishing in the Portuguesa River as their principal income. A government report (Agiiin 1997:7) stated that the lack of
employment options in Venezuela is limiting the op;lortunities of
village fishers to find work elsewhere, attracting outsiders to join
the ranks of local commercial fishers, and accelerating fishing
pressure in the Portuguesa River. Statistics in a 1997 national
report on sustainable development (Bohbrquez, Chacin and Viana
1997:9) illustrate a deepening rift in Venezuela's population of over
22 million people between a rich minority and a poor majority:
60 percent of urban residents live in impoverished conditions,
the "poverty index" (the sum of unemployment rates and
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol18/iss2/6
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consumer inflation rates) rose from 8.6 percent in 1970 to
52.2 percent in 1993,
the percentage of homes in poverty climbed from 36 percent in 1984 to 62 percent in 1993, and
the percentage of homes under extreme poverty, that is, unable to cover the cost of basic food, increased from 1 1 percent to 33 percent during the same period.
These statistics suggest that the Portuguesa River fishery
provides a higher level of food and income security than could be
found by the watershed residents if they were to search for work in
other areas of the country. This is an incentive for villagers to fish
sustainably. The difficulty and expense of leaving the area is a
positive indicator of CBM feasibility in the Portuguesa River watershed.
Presence Of Community

-

As its name implies, community-based conservation is rooted in the
concept of community.
According to Gardner and Stern
(1996: 143), "there is a connection between community resource
management and the strength of community feeling." In our survey,
a 5-point scale measured sense of community where a score of 5
was high and a score of 1 was low. The mean score of all households surveyed was 4.2, suggesting a widespread and high sense of
community in the watershed, which is a positive indicator of the
feasibility of CBM in the Portuguesa River watershed.
Stable, usually small population. A discussion coincident
to RRA community map-making suggested that the population of
each village grew rapidly in the 1960s following a governmental
land reform program that encouraged settlement and dlvelopment
of Venezuela's rural areas (Smith 1974). Following this influx and
growth, villagers stated that the populations of each village have
remained relatively stable. In 1998, the number of households in El
Potrero was 125, in Quebrada del Mam6n was 90, and in Nueva
Florida was 92. These stable and small village populations are
positive indicators of CBM feasibility.
Thick network of social interactions. Observations indicate
that extensive familial relationships and kinship ties in the three
villages have existed for generations (personal observations 1998).
Published by eGrove, 2002
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Two questions from the sense of community scale also demonstrate
the extent of villager interactions and social interdependence. To
the question "The friendships and associations you have with other
people in your village mean a lot to you," 86 percent of households
surveyed in the three sites combined agreed. Villagers were also
asked, "You regularly stop and talk with people in your village" to
which 80 percent agreed. The responses to these questions show
that there is a high level of village networking and connection. The
results of these survey questions and direct observations in the
villages merit the designation of a network of social interactions as
a positive indicator of the feasibility of CBM.
Shared norms, especially norms for upholding agreements.
In the three villages, 80 percent of surveyed households responded
that they agree with other villagers about what is important in life,
indicating shared norms. During RRA activities, the Neighborhood
Association in each village was identified as vital to conflict resolution, the organization of community activities, and for facilitating
compliance with community agreements. The existence of shared
norms and community organizations for upholding agreements is a
positive indicator of the feasibility of CBM.
Resource users have suflcient local knowledge of the
resource to devise fair and effective rules. RRA river-fishery maps
illustrated detailed familiarity with the ecological and seasonal
processes affecting fish species behavior and fishing activities in
the Portuguesa River watershed. Clearly, the breadth and depth of
this local knowledge can inform conservation plans and is a positive
indicator for successful future CBM.
Willingness to participate. In our survey, a 5-point scale
measured willingness to participate where a score of 5 was high and
a score of 1 was low. The mean response of all households surveyed was 4.04, suggesting that residents were very willing to
participate in localized fishery protection efforts. Considering the
scale items singly, 81.5 percent of respondents said they were
willing to participate in CBM efforts, 84 percent were willing to
work with other people from their village in such conservation
efforts, and 67 percent were willing to work with people from other
villages in the watershed. These results are important because the
resource control assessment suggested that migrating fish populations require coordinated watershed management. Therefore,
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol18/iss2/6
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willingness to participate at both the local and watershed level is a
positive indicator of the feasibility of CBM in the Portuguesa River
watershed.
Results: Characteristics of Government and Institutions
Devolution of Power to Local Level

..

Community-based fishery management is possible to the extent that
the laws and government allow it to be. The willingness of governing agencies and institutions to devolve power is as important as the
willingness of the people to participate. Studies in Colombia
(Lowenstein 1989) and in the Caribbean (Renard 1991) have revealed that local-level natural resource management projects have
been limited by centralized government policies and regulations
that perpetuate "a tradition of non-participation" (Renard 1991:6).
This appears to be the case in Venezuela where the current, topdown management of the freshwater fisheries dates back to the laws
established by the 1944 Law of the Fishery (Ley de Pesca 1944).
State and regional natural resource managers are charged with
enforcing rules made in Caracas that do not incorporate the unique
needs and characteristics of the varying watersheds they oversee.
Due to the variable timing of spawning migrations and the
site-specificity of fish assemblages, standardized application of gear
restrictions and closed seasons can deleteriously affect fish populations. Research indicates that although certain fish species are
found throughout the llanos, a vast number of fish species occur
only in local settings (Lilyestrom and Taphorn 1983; Taphorn 1989;
Winemiller 1991:12). One study showed that within a Venezuelan
watershed, neighboring streams shared less than 50 percent of their
species (Taphorn 1989). These data emphasize the need for sitespecific fishery management that utilizes the input and experience
of local residents and fishers. Yet, fishery researchers and government managers perceive local people as being incapable of running
the fisheries effectively and sustainably. Governmental hesitation
to devolve power is a negative indicator of CBM feasibility in the
Portuguesa River watershed.
Government Values Local Knowledge. Even though the
utility of local knowledge to fisheries management has been demPublished by eGrove, 2002
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onstrated (Christie et al. 1994: 105; Neis 1992; Ruddle 1994:28),
government officials and fishery researchers often dismiss local
knowledge as anecdotal and unscientific (Johannes 1981:ix; Neis
1992:166).Thus, a major challenge to CBM is government acknowledgement that local users have knowledge of experiences with, and
connections to the fishery that give them management insight and
long-term commitment to the resource. This will not be easy:
Perhaps the most critical or difficult task is to reform governmental institutions. It is difficult because it demands that we dispel the myth that
governments have the exclusive mandate and capability to manage common property resources.
(Renard 1991:7-8)
In Venezuela, a fear of the "tragedy of the commons"
(Hardin 1968) pervaded the management hierarchy and contributed
to a widespread belief that the future of the fisheries lies in stronger
rules and tougher enforcement (Agiiin 1997:6; Bohorquez et al.
1997:40; Duran 1995:58; MARNR 1996a:42-43; Sanchez 1989:7).
During interviews, government officials reacted negatively to
proposed CBM:
It's impossible! [The fishers] aren't able to care for
the fishery because they are trying to catch as many
fish as they can. If a fisherman is able to catch 5
kilos, he isn't going to take only 3 and leave 2 kilos
for tomorrow. He's going to keep them all. (GN1,
personal communication, July 1998)'
A government fishery researcher concurred:

If the fishermen had control of the fishery, there
would be no control. Putting them in charge would
be the end of the fishery. (GN2, personal communication, July 1998)

I

Codes used in place of interviewee names to maintain confidentiality.
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In contrast, a respected leader and fisher in the Portuguesa
River watershed held that local knowledge enables fishers to manage the fishery more sustainably than the current top-down system:
We're the ones who know the river. We know the
movements of the fish, the rise and fall of the river.
We know where they put their eggs and when to
find them there. We know what we need to know
to catch the fish, and we know what needs to be
done to protect them. The fishermen are the only
hope for the fish in the Portuguesa River. (QMI,
personal communication, July 1998)

\

The current lack of government faith in fisher management capacity
is a negative indicator of CBM feasibility in the Portuguesa River
watershed.
Rules are a Product of Participatory Choice. Management
reliant on enforcement and policing is often ineffective where 1)
funding and personnel are limited and 2) the resource base is vast
and/or populations are migratory. This is the situation in Venezuela
where top-down fishery management hinges on encounters between
a limited number of the National Guard (enforcers) and fishers
(local-users). Compliance that relies on fearlprobability of being
caught, combined with pervasive bribery and corruption, has contributed to unregulated fishing in Venezuela. Thus, participation of
user groups in natural resource management is critical. According
to Gardner and Stem (1996:133), "rules that work are, first of all,
the product of participatory choice: Most of the people who must
abide by them have had a say in making and modifying the rules."
If the resource users are involved in the creation of rules, then the
rules will be perceived as more legitimate (McCay and Jentoft
1996:243). If fishers are responsible for enforcement, issues of
community commitment and individual status in the village can
influence fisher behavior rather than just fear of punishment.
Participation in both decision making and regulatory enforcement
can increase compliance (Davis and Bailey 1996:26 1-2).
Reflecting on regulatory inefficacy, a Portuguesa River
fisher agreed that compliance would increase if fishers were responsible for supervising themselves:
Published by eGrove, 2002
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If we - the fishermen - had more responsibility for
managing the fishery, it would be a very different
story. First, it would be almost impossible to fish
illegally without being discovered. Where can I go
fishing that I won't run into one of my neighbors
fishing as well? And I have respect for my
neighbors. If they make the rules, and then find me
breaking them, I am going to feel ashamed. (QM1,
personal communication, July 1998)
This supports research that involvement of the user groups in the
formation of laws and regulations increases both acceptability and
compliance (Davis and Bailey 1996:261-2). Gardner and Stern
(199 1:137) provided this explanation for the fisher's attitude: "It
only makes sense for an individual - even one who cares about the
group - to exercise self-restraint if there is reasonable assurance
that others will do the same." In the state of Portuguesa, the lack of
fishery rules that are the product of participatory choice is a negative indicator of CBM feasibility.
Legal Status Given to Local Regulations. For CBM to occur
"legal instruments are needed to provide the basis for the transfer of
management responsibility from a central government agency to
community organizations" (Renard 1991 :6). Given the prevailing
centralized approach, Venezuelan fisheries lack a legal framework
legitimizing management decisions and processes at the local level.
In the state of Portuguesa, the situation is made worse by a perceived triviality of existing regulations, further justifying the development and testing of locally-devised rules. According to a
university researcher:
The current laws are to blame for [the declining
Portuguesa River fishery]. These laws exist on paper, but that's the extent. There is a lack of people
to enforce the laws, and those that are [enforcing
the laws] can typically be given some money to
leave the fishermen alone. (UNZ1, personal communication, February 1998)
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Rule-bending and corruption at higher levels contributes to
a perceived lack of regulatory credibility. This further suggests that
rules made at the village level may be more widely accepted and
upheld by fishers, yet there is an absence of legal avenues for the
creation of such local initiatives and regulations. In his evaluation
of stewardship programs by private landowners, Cox (1995:245)
observed that "while the enthusiasm of the individual on the land is
critical, so is ... the passage of legislation that institutionalizes the
mechanisms and arrangements needed for proper and comprehensive support of such a stewardship program." The lack of legal
status lending credibility and stability to local initiatives is a negative indicator of the feasibility of CBM in the Portuguesa River
watershed.
Corruption-Free, Fair Enforcement

The importance of enforcement that is just, administered equally
throughout a society, and free from corruption is emphasized by
community management researchers (Gardner and Stern 1996;
Ostrom 1990). Such a regulatory high-road is not currently found
in the Portuguesa River watershed, counting as a strike against
CBM feasibility.
Bribes and Cheating Not Permitted. Bribery is common
between fishers and regulators in the Portuguesa River fishery:
The laws mean nothing as corruption is commonplace within the government and managing agencies. Rather than enforcing the laws, the National
Guard uses them as a means to manipulate the people into paying them money. Therefore, there' is
absolutely no emphasis on conservation. (UNZ1,
personal communication, June 1998)
A Portuguesa River fisher described the enforcement of
fishing regulations by the National Guard and the consequences that
corruption has had on fishing activity and compliance:

Now, I can go out and fish illegally day and night using weir seines, snag lines, and poison - risking
Published by eGrove, 2002
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only an encounter with the National Guard who I
can pay off. And it makes no difference to me what
[the National Guard] think of me because I have
absolutely no respect for them ... Each one can be
bought for a price. (QM2, personal communication,
July 1998)
The fisher's remarks demonstrate how the occurrence of bribery has
weakened user group respect for the regulatory system and, consequently, the effectiveness of these regulations and enforcement in
encouraging legal fishing practices. The current prevalence of
bribing and cheating is a negative indicator of the feasibility of
CBM in the Portuguesa watershed.
SelJshness and Social Elites Not Awarded. In the Portuguesa River fishery corruption often favors wealthy and politically
powerful resource users. "This rewards the selfish at the expense of
the resource and the people who depend on it" (Ostrom 1990-cited
by Gardner and Stem 1996: 134-135). One fisher summarized:
It is an unfair situation because the poor man, who
is trying to find food and money for his family, is
the man that suffers. The people without money
are the people that the National Guard makes comply with the laws; they take their cast nets and their
catch. But the rich man is the man who is able to
do anything without consequence. If he takes along
[$2-$10 dollars], he's able to pay the National
Guard for fishing illegally. It is a system in which
a few gain and the majority lose. (NF1, personal
communication, July 1998)
Even Portuguesa state fishery employees are affected by
corruption in the government:
Our fishery management is failing because the people in charge are augmenting their salaries with
money that we need to protect the fishery. Each
year we have less and they have more. Corruption.
The people that are taking our money think only of
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol18/iss2/6
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the money and don't think of how they are destroying a river. (GN2, personal communication, July
1998)

A centralized management system that rewards selfishness and
social elites is a negative indicator of CBM feasibility in the Portuguesa watershed.
Government Accountable to Local Users. Another indication of devolution necessary for CBM is that resource users have
sufficient political clout - regardless of their socio-economic status
- to hold natural resource managers and government accountable
for their management decisions and the subsequent consequences.
"Successful management requires that a high degree of decision
making and accountability be shared by fishers and government
officials" (McGinn 1998:9). The combination of an exclusive, topdown management hierarchy and a growing rift between Venezuela's richest and poorest members of society (Boh6rquez et al.
1997:46) has led to an overall inability of the rural populations to
contribute to management decisions. This includes families living
in the small, isolated fishing villages in the Portuguesa River watershed. The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) reports that "typically in most poor countries, and
in many rich ones for that matter, the weaker and impoverished
groups... have little voice and a limited role in influencing government" (Ghai 1988:25).
Factory pollution in the Portuguesa River watershed provides an example of an alliance between the upper levels of Venezuelan society and the inability of rural villagers to voice concerns
and affect change (for details see Zanetell 1999). Research has
documented that untreated effluent from a sugar cane didillery has
significantly lowered dissolved oxygen levels in the Portuguesa
River (Hernandez 1992:6-7; Winemiller et al. 1996:27) inducing
fish mortality during peak periods of alcohol production. Since the
distillery opened in 1988, legal wastewater standards have not been
met (MARNR 1996b) and local fishers have repeatedly reported
fish kills to the government to no avail. A water quality expert in
the state of Portuguesa observed:

Published by eGrove, 2002

21

Journal of Rural Social Sciences, Vol. 18 [2002], Iss. 2, Art. 6

Bribing Biodiversity

-

Zanetell and Knuth

151

To have power, one needs to have money ... The
fishermen that are discovering these disasters and
dead fish have neither money nor influence. Here
in Venezuela, there is nothing that the poor fisherman is able to do except watch the river dying.
(UNZ2, personal communication, July 1998)
This lack of status and power makes it difficult for rural fishers to
hold natural resource managers and government officials in the
state of Portuguesa responsible for their decisions and actions. The
current lack of accountability is a negative indicator of CBM feasibility in the Portuguesa River watershed.
Conclusion
The results of our application of the CBM assessment framework to
the Portuguesa River fishery suggest that while resource and user
group characteristics lend themselves to CBM, its feasibility is
severely limited by the negative influence of all government and
institutional characteristics. The following discussion of the major
challenges and barriers to CBM is based on the characteristics of
the Portuguesa River fishery at the time of the study and stakeholder opinions quoted here were in regard to the study site only.
Keeping the scope of the research in mind, it is plausible that the
implications and recommendations of this study may shed light on
other CBM projects and proposals in contexts where intercommunity coordination is required and/or similar barriers of
corruption and socio-economic/cultural divisions exist.
For the characteristics of the resource, the assessment
framework indicates that community-based stewardskip of migrating fish populations will be challenging, requiring coordination
among Portuguesa River watershed villages. However, the positive
assessment of all the user group characteristics suggests that resource challenges are surmountable. Villager fishery dependence,
sense of community, and willingness to participate in communitybased conservation efforts complement monitoring skills and resource familiarity that lend themselves to watershed level fishery
management.
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The potential for inter-village coordination in the Portuguesa River Watershed does not suggest that similar intercommunity communication and cooperation would be likely or even
feasible in other watersheds with different cultural and/or socioeconomic characteristics. Davis and Bailey (1996) caution against
assumptions of internal harmony or equity within fishing communities. It is logical that any conflicts emanating from such internal
differences would be exacerbated at the watershed - i.e. multicommunity - scale. Wade observed that both cooperative and
individualistic village societies exist (1988:2-3). Whereas the
former could help inter-village coordination, the latter could hinder
the efficacy of a watershed level CBM effort. The challenge of
inter-village coordination, especially in non-cooperative circumstances, is an important aspect of CBM feasibility in river systems
and of migratory fish populations. This challenge and how the
degree of inter-community coordination required may differ depending on the type of fishery (e.g., lake, coastal, migratory, nonmigratory, etc.) is an area that merits further research.
The assessment framework also illustrated that the current
characteristics of the government and institutions are significant
barriers to CBM feasibility in the Portuguesa River fishery. In
particular, a top-down, regulatory hierarchy is not conducive to
local participation and systematic corruption precludes sustainable
resource management. In regard to the barriers to participation, the
situation in the Portuguesa River watershed reflects conclusions of
the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
(LNRISD) about community-based efforts generally: "Despite its
promising potential, the participatory approach to development has
made little headway in official programmes and policies at the
national or international levels" (Ghai 1988:27).
Government resistance to devolving power is a common
phenomenon, especially in developing nations with longstanding
socio-economic/ethnic divisions between the haves and have-nots
(Freire 1970; Ghai 1988:25; Renard 1991).
Existing social, economic, political and cultural relations within communities and between communities and government or NGOs are often highly
resistant to change, precisely because they serve the
Published by eGrove, 2002
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interests of those who play a key role in defining
and maintaining these relations ... Most individuals,
communities, projects and organizations fear
change because of the potential for conflict, as well
as the possible attendant loss of power, which this
involves. (Leurs 1998: 133)
The fruition of grassroots stewardship requires a climate of
institutional openness in which traditionally dominant segments of a
population empower the traditionally voiceless to have legitimate
and meaningful input to the management process. Yet such a
climate is not possible if the current notion prevails that local
people are to be controlled by rather than included in management.
Dismantling this notion and reforming Portuguesa River fishery
management will not be quick or simple:
In the final analysis, resource management is a political process determined by factors of ideology,
political economy and social relations. [CBM approaches] clearly seek to contribute to a process
that promotes social equity, respects popular needs
and wisdom, and maintains cultural integrity and
sovereignty. It is therefore not surprising that these
orientations would meet with opposition where
there is fear of such a process releasing new talents
and redistributing power and responsibilities. Institutional change will be slow, but it remains indispensable to achieve the goals of resource
management and community development. (Renard
1991:9)
Yet, fear of and resistance to restructuring Portuguesa River
fishery management should not overshadow the potential benefit of
incorporating the assets of local users in sustainable resource management: from their detailed knowledge about the resource, to their
stake in its continuity, to their potential role in rule formulation and
enforcement.
Enabling local participation is one of the major barriers to
CBM of the Portuguesa River fishery. Overcoming corruption in
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol18/iss2/6
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the management hierarchy is another. Bribery as the dominant
mode of operation is illustrated by a researcher's observation:
It is a game of sorts that the fishermen and National
Guard play with each other, exchanging favors for
money and fish. (UNZI, personal communication,
June 1998)
A fisher concurred that fishery management of the Portuguesa

River:

. . . is like a game. From what I've seen, the National Guard has no interest in ending the game because there is money involved. It isn't in their
interest to share control of the fishery with us, because it means less money for them. (EP1, personal
communication, July 1998)
The research of Susan Rose-Ackerman suggests that the
interest of the fishermen and of the National Guard in playing the
game of corruption stems from the same self-interest that universally motivates human behavior, albeit with different outcomes in
different contexts. In her examination of the causes and consequences of corruption in different countries throughout the world,
Rose-Ackerman (1999:2) asserted that:

. . . the motivator is self-interest, including an interest in the well-being of one's family and peer
group. Critics call it greed. Economists call it utility maximization. Whatever the label, societies.differ in the way they channel self-interest. Endemic
corruption suggests a pervasive failure to tap selfinterest for productive purposes.
Rose-Ackerman continued that "self-interest and the public interest
frequently conflict" (1999:225). For example, while the fisher
(briber) and the National Guard (recipient) are the short-term beneficiaries, it is at the long-term cost of the Portuguesa River fishery,
and ultimately, biodiversity. For this reason alone, intervention in
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the current system of fishery management is justified, especially if,
as Rose-Ackerman hints, there are avenues for harnessing the
potential positive outcomes of self-interest.
Despite the difficulty of reducing corruption in Portuguesa
River fishery management, this challenge should be faced in Venezuela to prevent the prediction that the "Portuguesa River is finished" (UNZ2, personal communication, July 1998) from becoming
a reality rather than just a speculation. We do not claim to know
how reform should occur, but policy and institutional adjustments
should be based on a thorough understanding of the historical,
political, cultural, economical and sociological dimensions of the
Venezuelan freshwater fishery. Clearly, corruption is highly contextual and such information is a necessary foundation for reform,
yet we should be mindful of Rose-Ackerman's observation that
"culture and history are explanations, not excuses" (1999:5).
In response to fishery collapse, fishery officials and researchers in the state of Portuguesa are advocating for stricter rules
and tougher enforcement (Agiiin 1997:6; Duran 1995:58; MARNR
1996a:42-3; Sanchez 1989:7). Unless corruption is dealt with first,
increased top-down regulation may exacerbate the problem by
providing the National Guard and fishermen, both well-entrenched
in the bribery game, more opportunities to exploit the fishery for
personal gain. The bottom-line in eradicating corruption, according
to Rose-Ackerman, is economical: reform must eliminate existing
monetary incentives for bribery.
Enforcement and monitoring are needed, but they
will have little long-term impact if the basic conditions that encourage payoffs are not reduced, If
these incentives remain, the elimination of one set
of 'bad apples' will soon lead to the creation of a
new group of corrupt officials and private bribe
payers. (Rose-Ackerman 1999:6)
In sum, our CBM assessment framework not only allowed
us to evaluate the current feasibility of community-based fishery
management in the Portuguesa River watershed in Venezuela, but
also enabled us to identify the primary challenges and barriers to its
fruition. The challenge of inter-village coordination appears surhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol18/iss2/6
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mountable in the Venezuelan context. More significant barriers
include a lack of avenues for local participation in fishery management and corruption throughout the regulatory system. These
obstacles must be overcome to prevent declining fish species from
succumbing to the irreparability of extinction. Our study focused
on identifying these CBM barriers and discussing their implications. The details of reform necessary to facilitate CBM are beyond
the scope of this study. McCay and Jentoft (1996:246) aptly remarked that "in fisheries management there is no clear-cut, onceand-for-all, practical solution to the question of institutional design." It is apparent, however, that the collective knowledge of
fishing villages and local fishers is the last untapped resource
awaiting exploration and discovery in Venezuela.
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